An Essay In Doctrine
Although the words 'extension' and 'comprehension' have been used in logical textbooks for more th an three hundred years w ithout anyone offering a serious appraisal of their validity, the question arises whether this sort of vocabulary is well-grounded, and whether logicians can defend their position concerning this m anner of speaking. Let us examine w hether the words 'extension' and 'com prehension' m ay be employed legitimately within the domain of logic, or whether these two words convey adequately the meaning intended by logicians. B ut before we consider this vocabulary as p a rt of logic, the original meanings imposed on these words outside of logic should command our first attention. A b etter understanding of their multiple significa tion will help to avoid much of the confusion which has been associated with the distinction between these two words.
I. N ON -LOG ICAL M EA NIN GS OF ' E X T E N S IO N '
T he word 'extension' is derived from th e L atin noun extensio, which is based upon the past participle of th e verb extendo, extendere, extendi, extensus. This verb is composed of two L atin words ex out-|-tendere to stretch. The L atin extensio translated into words of AngloSaxon origin thus appears to mean a 'stretching o u t.' Certainly such a translation readily conveys more meaning to us than the words ' expanding, ' ' dilating, ' or ' amplifying. ' How extensio was used in L atin by classical authors and what different kinds of meaning it acquired in context will be made clear by an ordered series of examples of its usage by noted writers. For clarity, this section will be subdivided into four parts, followed by a sum m ary.
A.
The Thesaurus Linguae Latinae contains in outline form the various meanings of extensio. The prim ary imposition of meaning given is th a t of ' stretching out. ' As it is clear th a t the basic notion is th a t of a certain type of physical activity, it will be of value to study examples of the verb itself. All of the preceding examples contain the first and obvious meaning, namely, an act of stretching out. From these examples it should be clear th a t the prim ary and proper meaning of extension implies two elements: (1) the stretching out of, (2) quantitative parts. Extension implies th a t the p arts of q u an tity have a certain m obility; th a t they are larger or smaller; th a t more p arts can be compressed into less space and later can be made to occupy a larger space. I t also seems evident th a t this word refers to a particular aspect of a whole w ith regard to the position of its parts, for one m aterial object considered as a whole occupies the place where its p arts are to be found.
B. Let us focus our attention on certain passages where the meaning of the word is clear, b u t where th e explanations ju st given cannot be applied. In each example the expression 'to stretch o u t' will be discovered to make sense, y et there is always a proportional transfer of meaning.
Caesar employs the verb form in a less proper sense. From the notion of " prolonging a trip ," he transfers the word to the one who prolongs the trip. Thus he creates a new proportional meaning whereby the L atin verb extendere is transferred from the activity of stretching out some other object to the activity of whereby the doer of the action performs the action on himself. As a result, se extendere comes to mean " to make a journey." C. Seneca appeals to our imagination when he speaks of stretching out the ears. In this case, there is no stretching out of the ears in distance, b u t rath er a figure of speech to indicate th a t the ears are eager to catch the words of the orator. Here again one finds the word used in a less proper sense inasmuch as extension is no longer applied to local m otion in space, b u t to th e non-spatial movements of the appetite. This less proper meaning of th e word is used again by Seneca to denote a stretching out in the sense of relaxing oneself. In classical grammar, the basic notion of quan tity is retained when the gramm arian speaks of lengthening the vowel.
Syllaba longa fit natura, cum vocalis extenditur ( F o r t u n ., Gramm., VI,
279, 27).3 (.A syllable becomes long by nature when its vow el is lengthened.)
In this example, words are quantitative because the length of vowels can be measured, b u t they are quantitative in a less strict sense in asmuch as all of the parts do not exist simultaneously. Hence the act of stretching out or lenghthening is to be taken in a less proper sense.
D.
Besides referring to emotions and appetites which are common to animals and men, the word ' extension ' is also applied to peculiarly human knowledge and feelings. The Justinian Code, for example, speaks of widening the law by enlarging our understanding of the words. This operation is strictly intellectual. Vergil speaks of propagating or making known (stretching out) courage or glory, a quality which lacks all m aterial ingredients. 
Sum mary
Now to summarize the m ajor variations of the meaning of ' extension.'
Proper meaning: th e a c tiv ity of stretching ou t of a m aterial object.
T he notion of quantity is linked to th is particular meaning. T he result, th a t is, th e thing stretched ou t, is also related to it.
2. Less proper meaning: th e agen t of the action stretching him self ou t w ith reference to local m otion. T h is feat is possible because the doer of the action is him self a m aterial, q u an titative being.
3.
Still less proper meaning: hum an em otions and appetites are said to be stretchable even though th e y m ay n o t be m aterial objects in the sam e w ay as in th e preceding instances.
4.
Common meaning: know ledge which is in no w ay m aterial m ay also be considered as som ething stretchable.
I t is not amiss to make a few rem arks at this juncture concerning the proper and common meanings of words. A proper meaning is one which does not presuppose another definition. For example, if one says th a t " John is a m an," " P eter is a m an," the word 'm a n ' is being used in its proper meaning, because the definition of m an as 'rational anim al' presupposes no other definition. B ut if one de clares " this statue is a m an," there is a proportional transfer of meaning. One recognizes here a new meaning having a similitude w ith a prior meaning. The word 'm a n ' no longer retains a proper m eaning; it has now acquired a common meaning because it p re supposes another meaning by virtue of th e fact th a t it is predicated of the word 'statu e. ' In like manner, the proper meaning of extension (to stretch out) is present whether the word is used in its prim ary imposition, less proper, still less proper, or common meaning. However, each transition of meaning is somewhat more removed from the original notion. This so-called transition or transference of meaning can likewise be ex plained in term s of qu an tity which is always found in some form or other with each variation of meaning. W henever one refers to extension in the proper sense or less proper sense, the p arts or subject extended (stretched out) are always q u an titativ e per se. On the other hand, whenever the still less proper meaning is implied, the parts or subject are quantified per accidens. The analogical use of extension can be developed further so th a t the p arts are no longer quantitative, b u t are only spoken of or imagined to be quantitative. This evolvement of meaning has already been designated as the common imposition of the word.
II. N O N -LO G IC A L M EA NIN GS OF ' C O M PR E H EN SIO N ‫׳‬
Let us consider the meanings found in the use of the word ' comprehension,' from the L atin word comprehensio. The la tter word is based upon the past participle of the verb comprehendo, compre hendere, comprehcndi, comprehensus, which is composed of two Latin words cum w ith +prehendere to grasp. The best English translation for the Latin comprehensio is 'a grasping completely.' For brevity, the analysis of this section will be divided into three parts, followed by a summary.
A.
The T L L also presents an outline of various meanings for comprehensio. The prim ary meaning given is th a t of 'grasping' or 'seizing.' Once again let us study examples of th e verb itself. F irst of all, the word refers to the physical motion of grasping something w ith the hand. According to Cicero, From speaking of plants which take root and trees which adhere, one can advance by analogy to speaking of the female of animals as ' conceiving.'
Si mulier non com prehendit (Cels., 5, 21 fin).4 (If th e wom an does n ot conceive.)
B.
The second level of meaning is introduced when 'to g ra sp ' m ay be translated 'to em brace.' Now, however, the word no longer names a local motion, b u t a hum an emotional activity either on the p a rt of the sensible appetite or on th e p a rt of the rational appetite.
Comprehendere m ultos am icitia (C ic., Cael., 6, 13).5 (To embrace m any w ith affection.)
The Christian w riter, L. Coelius Lactantius Firmianus, talks about embracing virtue w ith zeal (the words studio complecti, 'em braced with zeal,' are prefaced to this quotation). Cicero also speaks of encircling someone w ith affection.
Comprehendere adolescentem hum anitate tu a (Fam., 13, 15 fin).7 (T o embrace th e you th w ith your kindness.) 1 
C.
The word is still more extended to another level of meaning, th a t of knowledge, whether sensible or intellectual. When comprehendere refers to sense knowledge, it is often translated by ' to perceive ' and not 'to grasp.' In the first example, the action of perceiving is performed by such external senses as vision and touch. In the second example, perception is made by the internal sense of memory.
' Quod e s t ' nec visu nec tactu nec ullo sensu comprehenditur: cogitabile est ( S e n ., Epist., 58, 16).1 (' W hat i s ' perceived b y neither sight or touch or any other sense: it is thinkable.) R es brevis est, u t facile memoria com prehendatur ( R h e t . , Her., 2, 19, 3 0 ).2 (T he thing is brief in order th at it m ay be perceived b y m em ory.)
The notion of perceiving or grasping with the memory is also evidenced in the following example:
. . . has quinque dierum disputationes memoria comprehendamus ( The word ' comprehension ' can likewise be applied to intellectual knowledge. In this case the word names or designates an activity of the intellect which draws the object to itself. Through knowledge, the intellect grasps and possesses the forms of things. In contrast to such activity, the first and second levels of meaning attached to the word 'com prehension' imply a reaching out of the object. Thus in the physical activity of grasping, the hand reaches out tow ard the thing; and in hum an emotional activity, the appetite wishes to grasp or reach out to the to tal en tity of a thing.
Here are examples where ' comprehension ' comports an activity of the intellect:
Omnes scelerum comprehendere formas, om nia poenarum percurrere nom ina ( V e r g . , Aen, 6, 626).4 (To collect all forms of crimes, to m ention cursorily all nam es of punish m ents.) N eq u e enim numero comprehendere refert species ac nomina ( V e r g . , Geor.,
2, 104).s (For to gather in number does not refer to species and names.)
This same intellectual activity can sometimes be considered from the viewpoint of the object. For example, Or the same activity can be regarded from the viewpoint of the knower.
B reviter comprehens a sen tentia (C ic., Fin., 2, 7, 20).2 (Expressing briefly b y a sentence.)
In the following example, although the use of the word compre hendere is in the realm of knowledge, yet it refers to the physical activity of containing because 'volum es' contain wars inasmuch as words are contained in books which in tu rn are signs of wars.
B ella comprehendere v ig in ti volum inibus (S e t o n i u s , Vit. P lin ii)} (To write of wars in tw en ty volum es.)
Cicero speaks of grasping something by the mind from some sensible sign. This activity implies a kind of argumentation. Even though, according to one dictionary,5 the seizure by in telligence is looked upon as an image borrowed from plants, namely th a t an opinion takes root because it has been im planted in the mind, it would seem more probable to look for a similitude between the hand and the intellect. In these previous examples belonging to this th ird p art, the L atin verb comprehendere is no longer used in its proper or less proper meaning. The word has now acquired a common meaning.
Placuit u t D iogenem H abitus
The very citations of Latin classical authors seem to dem onstrate clearly th a t the L atin word comprehendere was used on the level of knowledge. I t is surprising to observe, therefore, th a t the famous French etymologists, A. E rnout and A. Meillet, m aintaining the word comprehendere as used in this m anner did not pertain to the classical period. They state th a t the classical word applied to knowledge was apprehendere and not comprehendere. 1 The prim ary usage of the word comprehendere purports a physical grasping of something quantitative by th e most universally useful instrum ent of man, namely, the hand. This activity of grasping can be ascribed to an inanim ate element such as fire, or to an anim ate object such as a plant. This first meaning of p a rt A is always on a m aterial level of physical grasping. I t is called the proper meaning of comprehendere because all the other usages presuppose this significa tion of a physical grasping. In other words, all other meanings are measured or weighed according to this physical grasping.
A change occurs in p a rt B. While the object grasped may remain m aterial, one element of meaning is sifted from the word. The activity of reaching out physically with the hand now becomes a grasping of another type. In this next level of meaning, the thing th a t reaches out to grasp its object employs a different instrum ent, th a t is, either the emotions or the will. For example, the sensible appetite can be said to grasp (embrace) someone with affection. This new level of meaning is less proper th a n the first because it presupposes a similitude, namely, the likeness of things which are different. The likeness is founded on the activity of grasping, while the difference arises from the instru m ent employed to execute the activity of grasping.
Finally, in p a rt C, there is a further transference or sifting of meaning. Now the intellect, unlike the sensible and rational appetites, brings the object w ithin itself inasmuch as th a t which is known assumes an intentional existence. Here the knowing subject has no quantitative parts, b u t it does possess m aterial dispositions whereby th a t which is known is mentioned as if it were quantitative. In the case of the appetite, the object grasped becomes the measure of the one who grasps. However, in this th ird state, the level of sensible or intellectual knowledge, the senses or the intellect which grasp also impose their limits on the thing grasped. This th ird signification of comprehendere m ay be called the common meaning of the word. I t m ay be well to consider a few examples in which the noun comprehensio is found before the multiple meanings of the word are presented in a summarized form. On the purely physical level, this noun can purport a corporeal activity.
In the following example, comprehensio im ports a non-corporeal activity or state of affairs:
Sexta comprehensio, qua continetur urbs Rom a, am plectitur C aspias gentes (Plin., Nat., 6, 2 1 7 ).1 (T he sixth com prehension, in w hich the city R om e is enclosed, comprises the C aspian nation .)
Or again, the noun-form may be used to designate the activity of grasping with the senses or w ith the intellect. When he discusses the a rt of oratory, Cicero employs the noun form of comprehensio (Gr. 7repioaos) to mean a certain sphere, ex tension, circle or rounding of a sentence. Commenting on the rhythm of an oration, he declares, and in this discussion inquiry has been m ade, w hether it is in the whole of th at rounding of a sentence which the Greeks call irepioaos, and which w e call 'ambitus,' or 'circuitus,' or , comprehensio,' or 'continuatio,' or ' circumscriptio,' or in th e beginning on ly, or in th e end, or in both, th at rhythm m ust be m aintained ? 1
Summary
All of these variations of meaning attached to the word ' com prehension ' can be summed up in the following m anner:
Proper meaning: th e a c tiv ity of grasping com pletely a m aterial object. The notion of q u a n tity is also bound to this prim ary m eaning. And, of course, th e object grasped is likew ise related to it. 
3.
Common meaning : the external or internal senses are said to grasp, th a t is, perceive their proper ob jects w ith reference to sensible knowledge; or im m aterial know ledge is grasped b y an im m aterial faculty.
The same transference of meaning which evolved w ith extensio is observed to occur with comprehensio. In each distinct meaning of the latter word, the notion of q u an tity is always present. In its proper setting, comprehensio implies th a t the p arts or subject grasped are quantitative per se. In its less proper meaning, the parts or subject are quantified per accidens. Finally, in its common imposition of meaning, the parts are no longer quantitative. They are only said to be quan titativ e according to virtual quantity.
By way of postcript to this section, it is interesting to note th a t the sequence of meanings in the English language for the Verb 'to com prehend' did not follow the basic order of the Latin significations. Some meanings made an early appearance due to a literal translation from the L atin by Anglo-Saxon expressions: 'to o v ertak e/ 'to come up and seize/ etc. In the process of examining the various meanings attached to 'extension' and ' com prehension/ it was observed th a t the Latin words were first used to name a certain activity of m aterial things, and were eventually transferred to th a t special type of activity of certain living beings which is called knowledge. In this section an effort will be made to show th a t th e uses of these two words in such meanings are not only facts of language, b u t also th a t these meanings do have bearing in philosophy. I t is beyond the domain of this study to pass in review all of th e nuances of meaning th a t these words can convey in the philosophy of n atu re.1 This section will tre a t exclusively th a t branch of philosophy which is concerned with living mobile beings.
The justification for the above m entioned way of speaking is found when an adequate theory of knowledge is propounded. Consider, for example, the theory of Aristotelian knowledge as explained by St. Thomas.
K now ing beings are distinguished from non-knowing beings in th a t the latter possess on ly their own form; b u t the know ing being has also the natural capacity to possess th e form of another thing, for the species of the thing known is in the knower. H ence it is evid en t th at the nature of a non-knowing being is more contracted and lim ite d ; however, the nature of know ing beings has a greater amplitude and extension}
Because the nature of a non-knowing being is more restricted and limited while the nature of knowing beings has greater am plitude and extension, Aristotle has said th a t the soul [of knowing beings] is in a w ay all existing things; for existing things are either sensible or thinkable, and know ledge is in a w ay w hat is knowable, and sensation is in a w ay w hat is sen sib le. 3 W hen the m atter is limited by form, th e word 'lim itation implies perfection.4 B ut when the form is limited by m atter, the word 'lim itation' implies restriction, contraction and imperfection. Since m atter is the root source of inertia, all operations of a m aterial com posite flow from the form. I t m ust be remembered th a t all forms are im m aterial since they are non-m atter. When, however, composites begin to m anifest a greater number of increasingly complex operations, their forms m ay be said to be im material, th a t is to say, they have emerged from the limiting constraint (coarctatio) of m atter.
A thing is able to know then by virtue of its im m ateriality; and the level or degree of knowing depends on the level or degree of im m ateriality. Thus plants do not know on account of their m ateriality.1 B ut animals are said to be cognitive because they can perform newer and higher operations when they receive the forms of things w ithout all of their individuating conditions. And man is still more cognitive because the operation of his intellect is such an activity carried on a higher level.
In the passage cited (la , q.14, a .l), the Latin word extensio is of special interest. Although we have used in the translation the word 'extension,' extensio could have been adequately translated by the words 'a stretching o u t' or perhaps ' a stretch .' Words such as 'stretchab ility ' and 'stretchableness,' though not found in English dictionaries, could also be substituted and would be clearly understood. If objection is made to 'a stretching out,' it m ay be found acceptable to say 'stretching quality.' Thus the text of St. Thomas could read: " the nature of knowing beings has a greater am plitude and stretching quality." In the Latin original the two words extensio and amplitude name in a positive way w hat is m eant by the stan d ard Thom istic thesis th a t im m ateriality is the root-condition of knowledge. If one wishes to understand w hat is m eant by an im m aterial mode of recep tion proper to knowledge, the explanation m ust be given in term s of quantity, and yet, strictly speaking, neither knowledge nor its mode of reception is quantity. Even though knowledge is im m aterial, it m ust be spoken of as if it were m aterial. Ju st as m aterial beings are stretchable, so knowing beings, in a proportionate way, are also said to be stretchable. I t has already been m entioned th a t the L atin word comprehensio is best translated by the English words 'a complete grasp.' T his notion of grasping something completely or perfectly by a knowing power in relation to its object is also discussed by St. Thomas. The reader will note th a t the following passage will be very accurate and still clear if he substitutes m entally the words ' a complete g rasp ' each time the word ' comprehension' appears in the translation, and likewise if he substitutes the words 'to grasp com pletely' for the verb 'to com prehend.'
Properly speaking, one thing is said to be com prehended b y another if it is included w ithin i t ; for som ething is said to com prehend when it can apprehend anything in all its parts sim ultaneously, th a t is, to include it in every respect. N ow w hat is included b y another thing does not exceed it, b ut is less inclusive, or at least equal. H owever, these things pertain to quantity. C onsequently, there are two modes of com prehension according to dimensive and virtual quantity. According to dim ensive q uantity, as a cask compre hends w ine; b u t according to virtual q u antity, as m atter is said to com prehend form w hen no part of the m atter is left unperfected b y the form.
And in th is w ay any knowing power is said to comprehend its known object, nam ely, inasm uch as w hat is known stands perfectly under its a c tiv ity of knowing. H ow ever, when the thing known exceeds the a c tiv ity of knowledge, then the knowing power fails in comprehension. B u t th is excess m ust be considered differently in different powers. For in sensitive powers, th e object is compared to a power n ot only according to virtu al q u an tity, bu t also according to dim ensive quantity; in this th at the sensibles m ove the sense inasm uch as it exists in space, not only by force of the q u ality of the proper sensibles, but according to dim ensive quantity, as it is m anifest from the com m on sensibles.
W hence com prehension of the sense can be im peded in a twofold manner: in one way, from an excess of th e sensible object according to virtual q u an tity: for exam ple, the eye is im peded from comprehension of the sun, because th e force of th e sun's clarity, w hich is visible, exceeds the proportion of th e visu al power which is in the eye. In another way, on account of th e excess of dim ensive quan tity: for exam ple, the eye is im peded from com prehending the to ta l area of the earth, b u t it sees one part and n ot another, which did n ot happen in the first im pedim ent; for all parts of the sun are seen b y us sim ultaneously, b u t n ot perfectly since th e sun is too brilliant. N ow th e intelligible object is also compared to the intellect indirectly according to dim ensive quantity, inasm uch as the in tellect receives from the sense. C onsequently, our in tellect is also im peded from the com prehension of anything unlim ited according to dim ensive quantity, and this is so because som e of it is in the in tellect and som e of it is outside of the intellect. However, the intelligible object is n o t related directly to the in tellect according to dim ensive quantity, since the in tellect is a power not using a corporeal organ; b u t it is related directly to th e latter only according to virtual quantity. And, therefore, the com prehension of the in tellect is im peded in those things which are understood directly w ithout conjunction to the sense only if there is an excess of virtual quantity: for exam ple, when w hat is understood has a more perfect m ode of being understood than th e m ode b y which th e in tellect understands. If, e.g., anyone know s th e conclusion th at a triangle has three angles equal to tw o right angles because of a probable reason, based upon authority, or because it is com m only said, such a person does not com prehend it, not because he is ignorant of one part of it, another part being known, b u t because th at conclusion is know able b y a dem onstration, to w hich the knower has n ot y e t attain ed; and, therefore, he does n ot com prehend it, because it does n ot stand perfectly under his know ledge. 1 This passage indicates th a t com-prehensio has several ways of being used w ith reference to sensible and intellectual knowledge. Ju st as 'extension' names the capacity of a knowing being to stretch out tow ard a certain num ber of knowable things, so 'com prehension'
signifies the complete grasp of knowable things.1 In this section {De Ver., q.8, a.2) it seems th a t St. Thomas is acting as a psychologist analyzing our activity of knowing. He is explaining the relation be tween concepts and things, b u t not the relations between the concepts themselves. I t is easy to observe th a t St. Thom as uses the word comprehensio in respect to intellectual knowledge alone with great care. Since intellectual knowledge implies concepts, it would seem consistent w ith the teaching of St. Thomas to speak of the 'comprehension and extension of concepts.' B ut, on the other hand, w hat do m any logicians mean when they speak of the comprehension and extension of concepts?2 Are concepts the proper domain of logic, or are they proper to psychology?
In answer to these questions it would appear th a t those who speak of the comprehension and extension of concepts needlessly confuse students on the difference between logic and psychology. Logic is not directly interested in the concept b u t in the m ultiple and intricate relationships which arise between several concepts when m an tries to obtain scientific knowledge about things. This needs further explanation.
In psychology, the concept is sometimes called the intelligible species or the m ental word.
The in tellect understands som ething in a twofold way: in one manner formally, and thus it understands b y m eans of the intelligible species by which it is put into act; in another manner as an instrum ent which it uses in order to understand anything, and in th is w ay the in tellect understands b y m eans of a concept, because it forms the concept for this purpose that it understands the th in g. 3 A concept, an intelligible species, or a m ental word, is said to be an instrum ent by which the intellect knows a thing. As such it is a quality of the intellect, a personal possession. One does not say th a t the concept is the thing known because a concept and its object are not physically identical. This distinction between a concept and its object is implied when one refers to the ' o b ject' of knowledge which 1 . In view of such meanings, one is justified in foreseeing the use of 'extension' to mean 'a stretching out to more and more things' and the use of 'comprehension' to signify 'a constantly improving grasp of the things known.' B ut more of this later. signifies something th a t is different from knowledge. W hereas the concept itself as an instrum ent or means of knowing is a real being, the object of knowledge m ay be either a being or a non-being. For example, although Cinderella m ay not exist, a concept of her is none theless real. Inasm uch as they exist in the mind for the purpose of bringing the knower in contact w ith things, concepts are called intentions. If these concepts are directed towards objects, real or not, they are called 'first intentions.' B ut when these concepts of things are considered in relation to each other, relations between th e concepts arise because of the things known. These relationships are called ' second intentions.'
T hose things w hich are first understood are th e things outside the soul toward w hose understanding the in tellect is first borne. B u t the in ten tion s follow ing upon our m ode of knowing are said to be the second things understood: for b y this second a c tiv ity the in tellect understands inasm uch as it is b en t back on itself, understanding (1) th a t it under stands and (2) the m ode b y which it understands. 1 Logic is not immediately concerned w ith the existence of a thing. " For the logician considers the mode of predication and n o t the existence of a thing." 2 I t is only directly concerned with relationships between concepts which are beings of reason. " And a being of this kind, namely, a being of reason, is properly the subject of logic." 3 F urther, it is worthwhile noting th a t unlike psychology which considers concepts independently of any relationship w ith words, logic is interested in concepts insomuch as they are bound to words. other hand, studies the relations (second intentions) between concepts. Hence it is possible for psychology to be interested in only one concept, th a t is, any concept insomuch as it is a quality of the soul. On the contrary, logic presupposes the existence of a t least two concepts about things because it is not interested in concepts as qualities of the soul, but rather in concepts as related to each other with reference to things. In fact logic demands a m ultiplicity of concepts because one m ust be able to say something of inferiors before science can prove any con clusions.
The am biguity of the expression 'extension and comprehension of concepts' should now be obvious. Taken literally, the expression belongs properly to psychology. If the words ' extension ' and ' com prehension' are to have any non-psychological meaning in logic, it would be because somewhere among the m any second intentions studied by the logician, some new and more restricted usage m ust be found. Or again, since the subject of logic is not concepts b u t the relations between concepts, then extension and comprehension should never be employed to designate concepts b u t rath er to indicate the relationships existing between concepts, or they should not be em ployed at all. Confusion on this point in a logical text can be taken as a sign of defective knowledge on the p a rt of its author. L'Abbé Lévesque, for example, confuses the two viewpoints when he discusses extension and comprehension in his treatise on psychology.1 In th a t text he considers the relations between ideas, a topic which is exclusive ly proper to logic.
The P ort Royalists and their admirers, in speaking of the extension and comprehension of ideas or concepts, displayed a weakened know ledge of logic. Although the P o rt Royalists were aware th a t logic studies relations between concepts, yet they attached insufficient im portance to such relationships. They treated certain foundations of logic, th a t is, the concepts, as more im portant th a n these relations. As shall be seen more clearly, th eir lack of respect for the predicables seems to be m irrored in their statem ent, " This is more th a n sufficient touching the five universals, which are treated at such length in the schools." 2 Even if the P o rt Royalists had assigned a proper role to the predicables in logic, still their use of such vocabulary as the ' extension and comprehension of ideas ' would continue to be a con sta n t source of confusion to th e neophyte in logic. Basing himself on such an expression, a beginner in logic cannot be expected to discern the fine nuances which separate psychology from logic. 
IV . EX TEN SIO N AND COM PREHENSION IN LOGIC
Now th a t the distinction between psychology and logic has been set forth, a proper way to use 'extension' and 'com prehension' in a strictly logical setting can be discussed in which these two words will have meaning with reference to second intentions. The best way to proceed would be by looking at the purpose and divisions of logic, and then the three operations of the intellect in reverse order.
A.
E xtension an d comprehension w ith reference to the purpose and divisions of logic
A t this point it should not be forgotten th a t certain logicians have attem pted to divide logic into a logic of extension and a logic of comprehension (intension).1 W hether logic is so divided on the basis of these particular aspects (v.g., extension and comprehension) will not be manifest until we consider the purpose of logic itself.
Since it m ay be said th a t logic is utilized by the philosopher of nature, the m athem atician, and the metaphysician, the to tal ulterior end of logic is science. This to tal ultim ate end embraces the attain m ent of both the incomplex and the complex unknown. The philoso pher of nature needs the instrum ent of attaining the incomplex and complex unknown objects in order to grasp reality in nature: the m athem atician also relies on logic for clarity in his grasping of the formal properties of quantity; and the m etaphysician needs logic to understand the properties of all beings.
The unity of logic, a speculative and liberal art, is derived from its end. As an art, the whole of logic m ay be divided into two p arts according as the unknown object of research is incomplex or complex. The perfect attainm ent of the end of logic presupposes a threefold operation on the p art of m an's reason, and it is this threefold operation which establishes the division of the subject m a tter of the science of logic. Since Aristotle actually uses the distinction of the incomplex and complex in his treatise On The S oul by dividing the activity of the intellect into two radically distinct operations, the divisions of logic according to the operations of reason need only be discussed here.2 Furtherm ore, it should not be forgotten th a t St. Thomas makes explicit the thought of Aristotle when he points out th a t this second The objects which form the basis for the division of logic as an art, nam ely the incomplex and complex unknown, are outside the realm of logic. And similarly the objects which form the basis for the division of logic as a science, nam ely the three operations of th e intellect, are also outside th e domain of logic. Therefore, if logic should be divided according to extension and comprehension, then these two words ought to name things outside of logic. Since F ath er Clarke's division of logic into one of extension and one of comprehen sion does not name things outside of logic, it is faulty.
B. Extension and comprehension with reference to the third operation
At this point the discussion can be restricted to an adverse argu m ent. In an objection posited by St. Thomas, the word ‫׳‬ comprehen sion ' is employed both with reference to definitions and to syllogisms. This is strange because it would mean th a t comprehension is proper to the logic of the th ird operation as well as to the logic of the first operation. Since the third operation is more directly ordained to the to tal ulterior end of logic, the meaning of the word ' comprehension ' in reference to syllogisms should be discussed first. B ut before such discussion is undertaken, it m ay be well to explain briefly the th ird operation.
The third act of our intellect consists in a process of moving from a first element to a th ird element by means of a middle element because " to reason is to advance from one thing understood to an other in order to know an intelligible tru th ." 1 In this process of reason ing, one moves in thought from knowledge already possessed to something new, or from something previously known in an im perfect way to a possession of it in a more perfect way. Is comprehension intim ately and properly linked to this process of reasoning ? Or does it belong equally to the th ird operation and the first operation? While reading an objection in which St. Thom as applies the word 'comprehension' to dem onstration, a process of reasoning which belongs to the th ird operation of the intellect, the reader should again substitute in his own mind the words 'to grasp com pletely' every time the verb form 'to com prehend' appears in the translation.
Besides, just as th e m ost perfect w ay of knowing com plex things is to know them b y dem onstration, so the m ost perfect w ay of knowin incom plex things is to know w h at they are. B u t every com plex thing th a t is known b y dem onstration is comprehended. Therefore, everything concerning which the essence is known is comprehended. B u t those who see God through H is essence have a q u id ditative know ledge about H im , since to know w hat a thing is, is nothing other than to know the essence of th e thing. Therefore, angels com prehend the divine essence. 1 In this passage, the verb form 'to com prehend' is used properly in two w ays: there is a direct use and a derivative use of the word. The direct usage is found in the first operation of the intellect. The de rivative usage, which presupposes a prior use in the first operation, is found in the th ird operation. St. Thom as responds to the objection by declaring th a t before anything can be comprehended, its definition (m atter which comprises p a rt of th e first operation) m ust itself be comprehended.
A thing is comprehended whose definition is known if only the definition itself is comprehended. B u t ju st as it is possible to know a thing w ithout com prehension, so it is possible to know th e thing itself w ithout com prehension; and so th e thing itself rem ains uncom prehended. B u t the angel, although he m ay see in som e m anner w h at is God, nevertheless he does n ot com prehend th is .2
In a long passage of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle offers an example of extension in the th ird operation when he discusses the variables of syllogistic reasoning. B ut again the discussion derives basically from genus and species in the first operation. In this passage3 the verb 'extend' occurs only once. B ut the L atin text of Aristotle contains several other words which are synonymous w ith the verb extendere: v.g., esse in plus (to be wider), excellere (to surpassagain w ith reference to extension), and excedere (to exceed, th a t is, to be wider or to have a greater extension). One should note especially th a t the words 'in p lu s' are used four different times.
In the original Greek text, this same passage contains the verb TaptKrdveiv* which is translated by the Latin verb extendere. The Greek word means 'to stretch o u t' or 'to extend.' I t is translated into L atin as " logice, eundem habere am bitum " b (logically, to have the same extension). Aristotle also employs the words eir'nrXeov with the verb irapeKTeiveLv. This expression is translated by the Latin words " latiorem ambitum habere" * (to have a wider extension). E7rt7rXeov is also translated by the L atin words 'in p lu s' which mean 'to be in m ore' or 'to be w ider.' In lines 99, 33-34, Aristotle uses the verb virapxtiv which is translated by th e Latin word excedere. In the logical sense, the word signifies " maiorem ambitum habere" 1 (to have a greater extension). In line 99, 42, the verb inrapxelv means " esse in eius a m b itu "i (to be in its extension).
Aristotle reduces this problem of relating the cause, effect and subject to the genus which he considers to be the first universal. Hence the problem of extension is not one of the third operation, b u t is rooted fundam entally in the genus and the first operation of the intellect.
In
If 'comprehension' can be used in the th ird operation of th e intellect, b u t only by presupposing a prior use in the first operation, perhaps if the same is true for 'extension,' we shall have proved th a t the two words are correlatives -wherever one is found, so will be found the other. Here is an example of extension in the Posterior Analytics which presupposes a prior use with reference to genus in the first operation. Therefore, of those things which are alw ays present in an y one thing, certain ones are extended in more: n ot, however, outside th e genus: b u t I say in more to be w hatever are present indeed in an y one thing universally, and truly in others. 6 Because Aristotle confines ' extension ' to the genus (a relation of the first operation), the word is employed here in its direct and not de rivative usage.
Since extension and comprehension are found in the third opera tion of the mind only derivatively, are modern logicians correct when they speak about the ' extension and comprehension of term s ' ? 7
According to Aristotle, the word ' term ' signifies the resolution of the premises in a syllogism (part of the th ird operation): " I call th a t a term into which the premiss is resolved, i.e. both the predicate and th a t of which it is predicated, 'being' being added and 'not b eing' removed, or vice versa." 1 Therefore, even if m odem logicians intend to name an activity of the first operation when they refer to the 'extension and com prehension of term s,' still their terminology is ambiguous and reveals a similar carelessness of thought and lack of precision exhibited by logicians who confuse psychology w ith logic by speaking about the 'extension and comprehension of concepts.' However, this m istake is less serious because to speak of th e 'extension and comprehension of term s ' is a problem of anticipation. Such logicians intend to speak about the first operation of the intellect.2
C.

Extension and comprehension with reference to the second operation
Since extension and comprehension belong to the th ird operation only derivatively, m ay it be said th a t they are derived from the second act of understanding whereby two concepts are identified or separated from each other ? I t would seem so because th e propositions entering in a syllogism are composed of subjects and predicates. Authors are found who confuse the problem of subject and predicate w ith th a t of comprehension and extension.3 According to them , th e problem of comprehension is identified w ith the predicate being con tained in the subject, and the problem of extension is confused w ith the subject being contained in the predicate. Subject and predicate pertain to the second operation of reason.
There are, however, three acts of reason . . . B u t the second operation of the in tellect is com position or division of the in tellect in which there is now th e true or fa lse. 4 This act of affirming or denying by statin g th a t a thing is or is not denotes more th an a mere conception of essences; it concerns the very existence of a thing. Hence one m ay speak of a concept such as 'a stick with one end,' b u t one m ay not make a valid statem ent th a t 'a stick w ith one end is possible.' Although logic treats of true and false enunciations,1 it does not trea t of true or false concepts because the product of the first operation, namely, the concept, does not say anything about the existence of a thing. I t is only in the product of the second operation, namely the enunciation, composed of subject and predicate, th a t one finds tru th or falsity following upon the declaration in the intellect th a t something exists in reality. One m ust remember th a t w hat is being considered in an enunciation is not two concepts, b u t either two realities, or one reality under two aspects, which are either composed or divided. St. Thom as explains this second operation of the mind in the following m anner: B u t the second operation concerns the very existence of a thing, which results from the union of the principles of a thing in com posites, or, as in sim ple substances, it accom panies its sim ple nature. And because the truth of th e in tellect is from the fact th at it conform s to a thing, it is evident th a t according to this second operation, the in tellect cannot truly abstract w h at has been joined in reality, because in abstracting a separation would be signified according to the very existence of the thing, ju st as if I abstract m an from w hiteness b y saying: 'm an is not w h ite,' I signify that there is a separation in reality. C onsequently, if according to reality man and w hiteness are not separated, the in tellect w ill be false. B y this operation, therefore, th e intellect can truly ab stract only those things which are separated according to reality . . .2 Some modern logicians speak of a judgm ent of extension whereby the subject is in the predicate because the predicate includes more objects th an the subject, and a judgm ent of comprehension or intension whereby the predicate is in the subject because the subject embraces more attributes th an the predicate. Though logicians are nam ing certain results or effects whose cause is in the first operation, they do not seem to make it clear th a t in every enunciation and in every subject and predicate there is a problem of extension and comprehen sion. Extension and comprehension can be applied to this second act of understanding only in a derivative sense, because only in an enuncia tion can the to tal possible extension and comprehension be de facto limited to a particular context. Therefore, if extension and com prehension are used w ith reference to second intentions as explained before, the proper locus for determining their role is w ithin the first operation of the mind. In other words, the supposition of an enuncia tion presupposes its meaning.
By way of anticipation it m ay be said th a t simple apprehension expresses its intelligible content in the form of a concept or idea because " one act of the intellect is the understanding of indivisible or incomplex things according to which one conceives w hat a thing is." 1 For example, one m ay have a concept of a 'river,' 'm ountain,' or 'valley.' This act of simple apprehension does not involve any judgm ent or enunciation. Something is conceived w ithout affirming or denying anything about it.1 I t is an act of the intellect knowing something. This act of the mind tells us only w hat a thing is rath er th a n th a t it exists: th e first operation is indeed concerned w ith th e very nature of the thing according to which any understood thing holds som e grade am ong beings, w hether it be a com plete thing, as any whole, or w hether it be an incom plete thing, as a part or a ccid en t.8 N or does this operation entail any error because . . simple objects are neither true nor false, and because the intellect is not deceived in th a t which a thing is . . . " * If 'extension' and 'comprehension' are found properly in the logic of the first operation, and found conjointly in every enunciation, further evidence is seen why it would be ridiculous to have a logic of extension and a logic of comprehension. This would mean th a t every enunciation requires two logics: one of extension and one of compre hension. Such a position seems to destroy the per se unity of an enunciation. Needless to say, such a division has nothing to do with the expression 'extension and com prehension' which is derived from the Port Royal Logic.
D. Extension and comprehension with reference to the first operation
In the course of studying the first operation of the mind, the second intentions which should be given principal consideration are the ' predicaments ' and the ' predicables ' because they are necessary tools for the form ulation of definitions and the execution of divisions. The predicaments are related to the predicables as m atter is related to form. In nature, m a tter is ordained to form, b u t as the less dignified to the more dignified. B u t in the case of certain liberal arts, form is ordained to m atter, as the less dignified to the more dignified; and in this p a rt of logic, th e predicables as form are ordained to the 1 predicam ents as m atter as to something more dignified. The predi caments will be considered first because they are more dignified and closer to the end of logic than the predicables.
i) The predicaments. Some logicians classify the predicam ents as first intentions instead of second intentions. Their error is caused by the fact th a t they neglect to distinguish between modes of being and modes of predicating (modi praedicandi).
I t m ust be know n th a t being is not divided u n ivocally into the predica m ents, as genus into species, b u t according to th e diverse m ode of being. B u t the m odes of being are proportionate to the m odes of predicating. For b y predicating anything of any other, w e say th a t this is that: whence the ten genera of being are said to be the ten predicam ents. 1 Although the modes of being are proportionate to the modes of predicating, the former are first intentions belonging to metaphysics, while the la tter are second intentions belonging to logic. Hence if one speaks of a first intention as a predicam ent, he is in fact naming a mode of being, even though the reason for the nam e is found in the intellect. Here our interest is confined to a predicam ent as a mode of predication, th a t is, as a second intention on logic.
In order th a t anything be predicated of another, it m u st be, first of all, universal. A t this point a clear understanding of the use of the word 'universal' is necessary.2 The word 'universal' can be con sidered in two different ways: and consequent upon the first way, it will be used with reference to both the predicaments and the pre dicables. In the first way, the word 'universal' can be used to name a common nature when it underlies an intention of universality, th a t is, a substitute mode of existence by the mind. For example, something can be ascribed to this common nature accidentally by reason of the thing in which it exists. Thus when we say th a t a man is 'w hite,' white m ay be considered substantial because it exists in a substance and yet it is only accidentally substantial.
In still another way, the word 'universal' can be used w ith reference to the common nature itself w ithout any consideration being given to a mode of existence. N othing is true of it except w hat belongs to it as such. Thus it pertains to m an to be 'rational,' 'anim al,' 'sentient,' 'living,' and whatever else the definition of man includes, whereas the accidents 'tall,' 'young,' 'American,' etc., which are not included in the concept of man, do not belong to m an as man.
This common nature has a twofold existence: m aterially in in dividuals, and im materially in the intellect. In both modes of existence, the common nature which is called a universal is found to exist accord ing to the peculiar properties of th a t which gives it existence. W hen this common nature is considered as existing in particular things, th a t is, w ith the intention of universality proper to the mind left aside, the universal is said to exist in the particular. Otherwise, one could not say th a t the nature of m an exists in the individual. The intention of universality is not found in the particular because it is opposed to the individuating power of prime m atter. When the com mon nature assumes a mode of existence in and provided b y the in tellect, it takes on an intention of universality because of the abstract ive power of the intellect. In this case it m ay be said th a t the universal nature exists in the universal. 1 Perhaps the thought of St. Thomas in the paraphrase will be clearer if summarized in an outline. The universal mode of existence which is implied by the intention of universality can in tu rn be considered in two ways: (1) from the viewpoint of the intellect which actually makes the existence, or (2) from the viewpoint of the common nature which receives the existence. The necessity for such a distinction is seen to be implied when the citation from the treatise On The Physics is contrasted with th a t On The Soul. However, to make the implication clear, certain gram m atical observations are necessary.
The L atin expression modus praedicandi (mode of predicating) is proportionally equivocal because it can signify either the activity of predicating or the passivity of being predicated. The gerund form 3 praedicandi m ay be interpreted as the genitive case of either the active infinitive praedicare (the activity of predicating) or the passive infinitive praedicari (the passivity of being predicated). Hence modus praedicandi is analogical because according to the context it may have an active or a passive signification.
I t m ay be well to consider, for example, other L atin verbs such as amo and tango: both verbs have an active infinitive form (amare: to love; tangere: to touch) and a passive infinitive form (am ari: to be loved; tangeri: to be touched). The infinitive forms of these two verbs do no t create a problem, b u t as soon as the active infinitive In English, clarity of expression is also lacking. The English infinitive is neither active nor passive. The infinitive is generic in asmuch as it has indifferently an active or a passive meaning. If one considers the infinitive forms of the verbs 'to re a d ' and 'to d o ' outside of a sentence structure, their meaning is ambiguous since they can denote either activity or passivity. Of course, this am biguity could be eliminated if a compound tense were introduced: v.g., 'to be read ' or 'to be done.' B ut we are only interested here in the simple tenses as we compare the Latin and English infinitive and gerund forms. In context the infinitives 'to read,' and 'to d o ' m ay possess two meanings. If one declares, 'I am going to read a book,' the infinitive is active. B ut if one states, 'I have a book to read,' the infinitive is passive because the sentence really means 'I have a book to be read.' The infinitive 'to d o ' also has an active sense in the sentence 'I am going to do some chores,' and a passive nuance in the sentence ' I have some chores to do,' th a t is, 'some chores to be done. ' English present participles are likewise equivocal. 'Cooking' and 'selling' may be either active or passive in meaning depending upon their context. In the sentences 'his wife is cooking d in n er' a n d 'he is selling books,' the participial forms 'cooking' and 'selling' are active; b u t in the sentences 'the food is cooking slowly' and 'the book is selling well,' the present participles are passive in mean ing.
The same am biguity exists in the English gerunds. If one refers to the 'process of ageing,' the gerund m ay denote either an active meaning, namely, 'the process of ageing wine,' or a passive sense, namely, 'the process of becoming older.' The same equivocation can be found in the expression ' the act of graying.' The gerund ' graying ' m ay signify either the active meaning of coloring an object gray, or the passive sense of becoming gray, th a t is, when it refers to a person's hair.
Similarly, the terminology 'mode of p redicating' (modus praedicandi) is equivocal because it can be interpreted actively or passively. If one interprets the 'mode of predicating' in an active sense, he names a 'predicable'; b u t if he construes the 'mode of predicating' in a passive sense (the more accurate expression would be the ' mode of being predicated'), he names a 'predicam ent.' T h at is the reason why St. A lbert used the adjective ' predicable ' (praedicabilis) 1 with a passive meaning to designate a predicam ent, because predicable means ' th a t which can be predicated.' A t the same time he employed the words universalis and ordinatio praedicabilium when he refer red to the predicables, in order to emphasize the intellectual activity of producing the universal intentions.2 W hen the word 'universal' is being used in the intellect from the viewpoint of actually making existence, it is a mode of predicating called the 'predicable.' B ut when the word 'universal' is being used from the aspect of the common nature receiving existence, it is a mode of predicating called the 'predicam ent. ' Now th a t we have examined the two modes of active and passive predication, we shall consider whether or not extension and com prehension are proper to the passive mode of predicating, namely, the predicaments. Such an investigation, w hether it yields positive or negative inform ation, will deepen our understanding of extension and comprehension as we proceed to find th e basic source of these two properties. Aristotle enum erates ten different ways in which things can be predicated (note th e passive form 'can be predicated'). These ways are called by logicians today either the ten categories, predicaments, predicates, or supreme genera.
E xpressions which are in no w ay com posite signify substance, quan tity , quality, relation, place, tim e, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch m y m eaning roughly, exam ples of substance are ' m a n ' or ' the horse,' of q u an tity, such term s as ' two cubits lo n g ' or ' three cubits lon g.' . . } Due to lack of space, only the predicam ents of q u an tity and substance will be considered h ere: first of all, quan tity , because some logicians have recognized 'extension' and ' com prehension' as quan tities.4 They identified extension as an external q u an tity w ith the dimension of breadth, and comprehension as an internal q u an tity with the dimension of depth. These men were inclined to call concepts quantities containing 'u n d e r' themselves (extension) and 'in ' them selves (comprehension) certain attributes. In view of their way of speaking, it would seem a t first glance th a t the words 'extension' and 'com prehension' belong to th e predicam ent or category of quantity. According to Aristotle, qu an tity is either continuous or discrete.1 After citing examples of these two species of quantity, he remarks th a t " strictly speaking, only the things which I have men tioned belong to the category of q u an tity : everything else th a t is called quantitative is a q u an tity in a secondary sense." 2 In other words, if extension and comprehension are used w ithin the limitations of the predicament 'q u an tity ,' their meaning is restricted to their first univocal usage. B u t such a restriction is not adequate to th e to tal usage of these two words in logic because no allowance would be made for their analogical usage w ith reference to virtual quantity. Conse quently, if and when extension and comprehension are employed in these analogical senses, they cannot belong properly to the predica m ent of quantity.
For this to be clear, it should be remembered th a t the first meaning of extension is synonymous w ith th a t of quantity. B ut when one declares th a t the genus of q u antity has a greater extension th a n a species of q u an tity (v.g., a triangle), then th e word 'extension' has a non-quantitative sense.
When the English logician, Sir William Ham ilton, said th a t " a concept is, therefore, necessarily a q u an tity ," 3 he made a very im portant observation on the methodology proper to logic. If this passage is understood to mean th a t concepts are to be univocally placed under the predicam ent of 'q u an tity ,' the meaning is mis construed. B ut if the statem ent is interpreted to mean th a t concepts are virtual quantities and th a t their properties, second intentions, are to be named and analyzed as properties of virtual quantities, such an interpretation is in accord with the m anner in which m an is obliged to analyse im m aterial realities.
Thus the usage of extension and comprehension, which is the subject of this study, is not proper to the predicam ent of 'q u an tity .' If the accidental category of qu antity cannot, it would seem likely th a t no other predicam ental accident could found the proper logical usage of extension and comprehension. Therefore, no further analysis of the other eight categories of accident will be given here.
The category of 'substance' should now be treated. Because substance m ay be extended to, or m ay contain under it, such beings as body, living body, animal, man and individuals, it m ay be inquired whether the predicam ent of 'substance' is the source or cause of extension and comprehension. Substance cannot be regarded as q u an tity in th e univocal sense of the word because the first substance is neither m aterial nor im m a terial. When, however, the genus of 'substance' is extended to two species, the same situation prevails as when the genus 'q u a n tity ' is extended to two species. This extension of substance, which is generic, to the species is not due to its nature as a predicam ent, b u t rather to the predicables which organize it. Therefore, the predi cam ent 'substance' cannot be the cause of extension and com prehension.
Extension and comprehension are not, first of all, concerned with the relationships involved in the passivity of th a t which is predicated, b u t w ith the relationship involved in the activity of predicating. Consequently, extension and comprehension cannot be immediate properties of the predicaments which are modes of being predicated; instead, they m ust belong to the predicables which are modes of organizing the activity of predicating.
it) The predicables. W hen something is attrib u ted to another thing, th a t something is said to be predicated about th a t thing. T h at thing about which something m ay be said is called th e subject, while th a t something which m ay be said about the subject is known as the predicate. The different ways in which a predicate can be related to a subject are called predicables.2 All predicables are universals because 'being said of several th in g s' implies a certain uni versality or repeatability, " And thus a universal is th a t which is ap t to be in m any and to be predicated of m any." 3 St. A lbert makes clear why the predicables are five in number, and only five. The word 'universal'2 can be used w ith reference to either the essence of a subject of which it is predicated, or something which is not the essence. If it signifies the essence, it m ay express th e whole form al essence (species, v.g., m an), an essential p art in inchoation (genus, v.g., animal), or an essential p art in act (difference, v.g., rational). If it designates something which is n o t the essence, it m ay express some thing which is necessarily connected to the essence of the subject . , VII, c.13, 1038 611: " th a t is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing."
3. Here the word 1 universal ' is used according to the first meaning which has already been explained.
(property, v.g., risibility), or something which is only contingently connected to th a t essence (accident, v.g., tall).
B ut the universal thu s taken as it is a predicable th a t is in m any and of m any, either it is present essentially or accidentally: w hether as an essence or as an accident. If it is present as an essen ce: either it is present as a whole essence or as an essential part. If it is present as a to ta l formal essence, it is evid ent th a t it is a species, because species is the w hole formal being of individuals concerning which it is predicated: because w hatever com es after the species com es from m atter or from individuating elem ents. If, however, as an essential part; then it is present either after the manner of a potency in which there is som e inchoate sort of being, or it is present after the manner of an act in which there is som e com pletely actuated being. And in th e first w ay it is a genus, but in th e latter w ay it is a differ ence. B ut if it is present as an a ccid en t: either it is present as an accident of nature which is caused and flows from the aptitude of its nature, or as a common accident which is an accident of the individual. And in the first way it is the property, b u t in the second w ay it is called the accident. 1 In the first sentence of this paragraph, St. Albert presents one word, namely, the word 'universal' and gives it two meanings by con sidering it from two different aspects: (1) as a predicament, when he says " it is a predicable th a t is in many and of m any," and (2) as a predicable when he adds the phrase, " either it is present essentially or accidentally." The reader is cautioned to remember th a t St. Albert employs the words ordinatio praedicabilium (universale id quo) to denote the predicables and the word praedicabilia (universale id quod) to signify the predicaments.
The five predicables are defined by P orphyry in his Isagoge. According to the order of knowledge, Porphyry defines them in the following sequence: genus, species, difference, property and accident. If, however, one follows the order of things in nature, difference should precede the species because the former is constitutive of the latter. Here the definitions of Porphyry will be considered in reverse order beginning with the common accident in order to ascertain in which predicable or predicables 'extension' and 'comprehension' are rooted. Porphyry offers three definitions for accident.
(1) A ccident is th a t which is present and absent w ithout the destruc tion of its subject.
(2) A ccident is th a t which m ay be present and n ot present to the sam e thing.
(3) Also th at which is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor property, y e t is alw ays inherent in a su b ject. 2 In his Topics, Aristotle offers a negative and affirmative definition of the predicate ' accident' in the same sentence.
A ccident, again, is th at which is n ot an y of these, neither definition, nor property, nor genus, y e t it is present w ith a thing, and is th at which m ay possibly b e present w ith som e one and th e sam e thing and m ay not be p r e s e n t . . .x
Here the predicate *accident' presupposes a knowledge of the pre dicable 'accident'; therefore, if extension and comprehension are related to 'accident,' it should be rath er to the predicable th a n to the predicate.
Although several logicians have considered extension or compre hension in reference to the predicable 'accident,'* these words could be ascribed to ' accident ' only in a derivative and not a direct sense; for the law of inverse ratio (namely, the greater the comprehension, the lesser the extension, and vice versa) does not hold sway, in fact it becomes u tterly ridiculous. Suppose, for example, one considers the modern medical notion of ' syndrome ' in which a group of signs and symptoms occur together and characterize a certain disease. Occa sionally such diseases do appear and they are not characterized by all of the signs and symptoms. Hence the law of inverse ratio does not apply to the predicable 'accident.' If one still wishes to speak of extension and comprehension of 'accident,' it m ust be only in a derived sense inasmuch as these words are employed in a more direct sense w ith reference to one or to several of the other predicables.
Four definitions are given by Porphyry for the predicable ' prop e rty .'
(1) For it is th a t which happens to som e one species alone, though n o t to every (individual of th a t species), as to a m an to heal, or to geom etrize;
(2) th a t also which happens to a w hole species, though n ot to th at alone, as to m an to be a b ip e d ; (3) th a t again, which happens to a species alone, and to every (in dividual of it), and a t a certain tim e, as to every m an to becom e grey in old age; (4) in th e fourth place, it is th a t in which it concurs (to happen) to one species alone, and to every (individual of it), and always, as risibility to m an; for though he does n ot alw ays laugh, y e t he is said to be risible, 1 . A r i s t o t l e , " The Topics," I, c. n o t from his alw ays laughing, b u t from being naturally adapted to laugh, and th is is alw ays inherent in him , in the same w ay as neighing in a horse. 1 Aristotle defines the predicate 'p ro p erty ' in a similar way: " Property, indeed, is th a t which does not show w hat a thing is but is present to it alone, and reciprocates with the thing." 2 I t should be noticed th a t Porphyry and Aristotle do not distinguish property from accident as flowing necessarily from the essence, b u t rath er as coextensive and convertible with its subject. B y the word ' sub je c t' is m eant 'species' because when Porphyry compares property to species, he declares th a t " it is common then to species and prop erty, to be reciprocally predicated of each other, . . ." 3 Although property and species have an equal extension, they do not have an equal comprehension. W hen one speaks of the species 'm an,' he does not speak of 'risibility.' Yet the property 'risibility' is implied because all men have a natural capacity to laugh. In this case, the property 'risibility' belongs to man in potency. B ut when one says th a t 'man is risible,' the property becomes actual. Hence the property has a greater comprehension th an the species because the more actual and less potential a being, the more determ ined and knowable it is.
Porphyry proposes five definitions for the predicable 'difference.' According to Aristotle, the difference is the determining p a rt of the species: " every specific difference united w ith genus produces species. . ." 6 Although the difference, like the property, possesses a certain extension and comprehension, the ultim ate specific difference is coextensive w ith the species. Since the species embraces explicitly the genus and difference, it contains more comprehension than the difference inasmuch as the la tter is not explicitly referred to the genus.
As a final remark on these three predicables, it is curious to observe th a t 'accident/ 'p ro p erty ' and 'difference,' which do not directly imply extension and comprehension, are expressed for the most p a rt by those gram m atical forms which today are called adject ives, and which the ancients referred to as adjective nouns. The time has now arrived to focus attention on those two predicables (species and genus) which are expressed by substantive nouns.1 P orphyry points out th a t the word 'species' is employed in three different ways. However, only the second and th ird meanings are proper to logic. Before considering whether extension and comprehension belong properly to species or to genus, or whether they belong to both pre dicables, it m ay be well to present, first of all, the definitions offered by Porphyry and Aristotle concerning the genus. The reality defined in the th ird usage of the word 'genus' in the Isagoge is th a t sort of genus proper to logic. In its third signification, Porphyry has already been seen to declare:
Again, in another w ay th a t is denom inated genus to which the species is subject, called perhaps from the sim ilitude o f these; for such a genus is a certain principle of things under it, and seem s also to comprehend all the m ultitud e under itself. As then, genus is predicated triply, th e considera tio n b y philosophers is concerning th e third, which also th ey explain by description, when th ey say th a t genus is th at which is predicated of m any things differing in species, in answer to w hat a thing is, e.g. anim al. 3 Genus is also defined as " th a t which is predicated of m any things differing in species, in (answer to) w hat a thing is;
From the interpretation of these definitions, three im portant facts can be discerned: (1) extension belongs to genus; (2) extension belongs also to species; and (3) the extension of the genus is greater than the extension of the species.
The extension of the genus is attested by Aristotle when he asserts th a t genus is predicated of 'm any th in g s' which differ in species.1
1. This statement should suffice to refute those logicians who maintain th a t extension is signified by nouns and comprehension by adjectives. Cf 
The very notion of extension implies a relation of one to m any, or a 'stretching o u t' (extension), of one to embrace many. The preceding statem ent may be paraphrased by declaring th a t the extension of genus is a relation of genus to its proper species, or a ' stretching out ' of genus to those species, and consequently to individuals. This logical relation of one to m any is prepared for by way of similitude when Porphyry defines the first non-logical use of genus as " a collection of certain things subsisting in a certain respect relatively to one thing, and to each other, . . . " 1 In this example, genus des ignates a relation of m any to one (multa ad unum) inasmuch as m any individuals form one group related to one head or ancestor. The notion of extension is attached to genus in this similitude because the individuals of a tribe or clan m ay be greater or lesser in num ber, and because such collection implies a t least two individuals.
The extension of the genus is further exemplified by Porphyry in his second non-logical usage of the word ' genus.' Again, after another manner also, the principle of the generation of every one is called genus, w hether from the generator or from the place in which a person is generated, . . .2 According to this similitude, the father is recognized as a genus and is collective if he has a t least two children. From the viewpoint of the children, there is the element of plurality or extension. This collec tive power of the father can be employed as a transition to realize th a t a logical genus m ust also have power over two or more species.
Extension is also attrib u ted to species when Aristotle mentions th a t " of all then of which genus is predicated, it happens th a t species is also p re d ic a te d ,..." 3 In other words, inasmuch as predication implies a relation of one to many, species is 'stretched o u t' to the same individuals to which genus is extended.
The extension of the species is explicitly and actively asserted by Porphyry when he says, " species indeed will always be predicated of the individual, and passively when he states, " the individual is comprehended in the s p e c ie s,..." 6 In the active sense, it m ay be said th a t species is 'stretched o u t' (extended) to one or more individuals -it is a relation of one to many. Passively, the individual or individuals are contained under the species -it is a relation of m any to one.
In his Metaphysics, Aristotle offers additional evidence for the logical use of extension when he treats the word 'genus' under the form ality of a whole;1 because the relation of whole to parts is basically a problem of extension. As the hum an intellect relies on the principle th a t the 'whole is greater th an its p arts,' so too everything in logic is to be reduced to the principle of qu an tity and considered as if it were quantitative in nature.
Further, Aristotle accepts and utilizes the greater extension of the genus as a fundamental principle in the Topics when he says, T he genus is alw ays more w idely extended than the species . . . Still th e elem ent relative to all such is, th a t the genus is of wider extension than th e species and the difference, for difference, also, is predicated of fewer things than th e gen us. 2 In other citations, he reiterates the greater extension of the genus when he says, " it is necessary th a t species should be predicated to a less extent [than genus]" ;3 " genus is th e most extensively spoken of a ll" 4; " the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus." 6 Porphyry likewise affirms th a t genus has a greater extension th a n the species.
The greater extension of the genus is based on the fact th a t one genus is predicated of two species as well as of individuals under both species, whereas one species is only predicated of the individuals under itself.
A t least, since the superior are alw ays predicated of th e inferior, species indeed w ill alw ays b e predicated of th e individual, b u t the genus both of th e species and of th e individual, .. .8
The greater extension of the genus is emphasized by contrasting it w ith all of the other predicables.
N ow , it is th e property of genus to be predicated of more things than difference, species, property, and accident are, .. .* Again, in an explicit manner, the greater extension of the genus is manifested by differentiating genus from species.
. . . b u t they differ, because genus indeed comprehends species, but species are comprehended by, and do n ot com prehend genera, for genus is pre d icated of more than sp eices. 2 Finally, Porphyry speaks of genus possessing a greater extension because " genera exceed, from comprehending the species which are under them . . . " 3
Ammonius emphasizes the greater power of the genus when he insists th a t while the species comprehends or contains individuals, the genus comprehends both species and individuals.4 Consequently, genus is more extensive than the species and individuals embraced by it, whereas species is only more extensive th an the individuals it contains.
I t m ay be concluded th a t while extension is ascribed to both species and genus, it belongs in the very first instance to the predicable ' genus ' which possesses the greater power to comprehend or to contain more things under it, and it then belongs to the predicable ' species ' inasmuch as the species participates in the unifying power of the genus.
Although the references to comprehension are found less frequently in the logical texts of Porphyry and Aristotle, still the few th a t are found suffice to show th a t comprehension belongs to species and genus. Porphyry speaks about comprehension when he explains how the species exceeds or surpasses the genus: " Difference is th a t by which species exceed genus . . . " 6 In order to associate the words 'exceeds' in the preceding quotation with the notion of comprehension, one m ust remember th a t the word 'com prehension' is basically ana logical: it can mean 'w hat is g rasp ed ' or ' how many are grasped.' In modern manuals on logic, the word 'com prehension' has been lim ited to one signification, and th a t one meaning becomes clear by the use of the word 'exceed. ' The action of grasping or seizing by the m ind as an instrum ent is further clarified when P orphyry speaks of the collective power of the genus (in the sense of how m any speices are grasped, or seized, or comprehended) and the collective power of the species (in the sense of w hat is grasped or seized, or com prehended): " for species is collective of the m any into one nature, and genus yet more so . . . " 1 Aristotle links comprehension to both genus and species when he talks about the species ' partaking ' or ' participating ' more intensely in a thing th an the genus.
T he definition of partaking, is to receive th e definition of w h at is participat ed. N ow it is evid en t th a t species partake of genera, b u t n ot genera of species, since the species accepts the definition of genus, b u t n o t genus th a t of th e species. 2 In this case, the species comprehends or grasps more of the whatness or nature of a thing inasm uch as it contains not only the more remote difference (which qualify the nature of a thing) which the genus contains, b u t the species also contains th e specific difference which constitutes its very nature. For example, the genus 'an im al' and the species 'm a n ' contain the differences 'sentient,' 'living,' and 'm a teria l/ b u t only the species 'm a n ' contains the specific difference 'rational.' Hence, as it has been said before, th e species participates more intensely in a thing th a n the genus, th a t is, it has a greater comprehension th a n the genus because it grasps or seizes more of the whatness or nature of a thing.
Comprehension is also ascribed to genus and species by the use of the expression 'determ inate qualification' (a^opiaiiov).
The determ inate qualification covers a larger field in the case of th e genus than in th a t of th e species: he who uses th e word ' a n im a l' is herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word 'm an. ' 3 Thus it seems sound to say in English th a t bo th genus and species have comprehension as well as extension. And it also seems safe to declare th a t genus has greater extension while species possesses greater comprehension. Extension and comprehension, because in trinsic to the definitions of genus and species, can only be m ani fested, and since they are n o t properties, they cannot be proved by a propter quid dem onstration.
V. G EN ER A L SUMMARY
I t is difficult to arrive a t any conclusions concerning the problem of extension and comprehension in logic if one neglects to explore the various significations of these words in other domains. An examina tion of the word 'extension' in a non-logical setting reveals four m ajor variations of meaning whereby a transition is made from the activity of the stretching out of a material object or the object stretch ed out, to the agent of the action stretching himself out with reference to local motion, to the stretching out of hum an emotions and appetites, and ultim ately to the capacity of a knowing being to stretch out tow ard knowable things. A threefold transition occurs w ith the word 'comprehension.' The word can vary in meaning from the physical activity of grasping a m aterial object, to the activity of the emotions grasping objects, to the activity of the knowing powers, w hether sensible or intellectual, grasping knowable objects.
There is a valid usage for these two words in psychology because all knowledge can be spoken of in term s of extension and compre hension. Knowing beings differ from non-knowing beings by virtue of a certain am plitude or extension. E very sense power is by its operation extended to an object and comprehends an object. Nevertheless, in psychology, extension and comprehension pertain to acts of knowledge and do not name second intentions or relations which are proper to logic. For th a t reason, one is obliged to reject as dangerous the ex pression ' extension and comprehension of concepts ' frequently found in modern logic textbooks.
To ascertain where the distinction between extension and com prehension can be localized in logic, one m ust be familiar w ith the purpose and divisions of logic. The end of logic is science which embraces both the incomplex and complex unknown. Perfect attain m ent of such end presupposes a threefold operation of m an's reason. Although extension and comprehension are found in the th ird opera tion of reason, they are used there only derivatively. Hence certain modern logicians deserve to be chided when they speak of the ' exten sion and comprehension of te rm s' inasmuch as the word 'te rm ' signifies a p art of the third operation.
Extension and comprehension also belong to the second operation of reason in a derivative sense. W hen some modern logicians speak of a judgm ent of extension whereby the subject is in the predicate, and a judgm ent of comprehension whereby the predicate is in the subject, th ey are naming certain results or effects whose cause is in the first operation of the mind. Further, such a position renders absurd the division of logic into one of extension and one of comprehension, a division which would necessitate two logics for every enunciation. This dichotomy would also destroy th e dem onstrative syllogism which contains extension as well as comprehension.
In the first operation of the mind, one finds two modes of predicat ing: a passive mode designated by the word 'predicam ent' and an active mode known by the word 'predicable.' Although some logicians refer to extension as an external q u antity and comprehension as an internal quantity, still these two words cannot be ascribed to the predicam ent ' quantity ' because such usage would restrict their mean ing to the univocal meaning of dimensive q u an tity and would make occasionally an entire chapter, is given to the distinction between extension and comprehension. Frequently this doctrine is introduced in the manuals before the predicables are ever considered, and it is presented in such a m anner th a t the reader wyould never suspect th a t extension and comprehension belong to the predicables of genus and species. 1 Because the discussion of extension and comprehension is badly placed in logical treatises, there is a tendency to magnify the im portance of this distinction out of proportion to its real value. Thus Jevons claims, " to anyone desirous of acquiring a thorough command of logical science, nothing is so im portant as a careful study of the intensive or comprehensive meaning of term s, propositions, and syllogisms." 2 Jolivet also considers the distinction of capital im portance for formal logic.3 And Bachhuber believes th a t compre hension and extension pervade the whole of logic to such an extent th a t a thorough and correct understanding of them is im perative if one wishes to establish a solid foundation for logic. 4 I t m ay be conceded th a t extension and comprehension are significant, b u t it m ust be emphasized th a t extension and compre hension are im portant only inasmuch as implied in the very definitions of the predicables. Any logical treatise which includes in its contents a section on extension and comprehension, and y et a t the same time excludes the predicables, is badly oriented because extension and comprehension present only two ways in which a predicate m ay be said of a subject, whereas the predicables present five different modes of predication.
M odern logicians also seem to overlook other im portant facts: the rules of definition are derived from an understanding of the genus and species. The definition of the genus, for example, is the first proper principle of logic. I t is of the utm ost necessity to manifest this first principle adequately and properly. B u t such a task cannot be accom plished unless a study of the predicables is made a t the beginning of logic. M any of the errors in logic textbooks could be avoided if this procedure were followed. The old adage certainly rings true in this instance: " parvum quantitate, magnum virtute." Applied here, the expression means th a t if a small error is made in the beginning, it will grow to huge proportions in the end. Such a phenomenon was am ply manifested in the historical p art of this study where it was seen how the moderns rejected the fixity of meaning imposed on extension and comprehension by the ancients, and introduced not only new words b u t also new meanings for the old words.
Therefore, the most fitting way to teach logic seems to imply beginnings w ith a study of the predicables. Once those active modes of predication have been mastered, the student will be b etter prepared to understand correctly the doctrine of extension and comprehension in logic. Furtherm ore, when logic is tau g h t it m ust not be forgotten th a t these two words, namely, 'extension' and 'comprehension,' should be understood analogically w ith reference to quantity. In fact all relations of reason are nam ed analogically from q uantity.
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